Library of Historical Apologetics

The “myth” of Alexander the Great

tim — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 00:01:05 +0000

Eumenes and Diodorus, the chroniclers of the daily affairs of this pretended conqueror and ruler, tell us he died on the eleventh of June, toward the close of the day. But Aristobulus and Ptolemy, who were at his bedside at the time, mention the thirteenth of June as the day of his death! What more is wanting to show the legendary character of this alleged history, when eye-witnesses cannot come within two days of the death of their hero? If I doubt the truth of the Gospel histories because they differ by three hours as to the time of the crucifixion of Christ; shall I believe the pretended history of this mythical Alexander, when eye-witnesses differ two days as to the time of his death! Certainly not. They cannot all be right, and the probability is that they are all wrong. The whole thing is, doubtless, a mere invention, as we have said; or a fabulous story gradually gathered around some village hero of Macedon, who, in some street quarrel, might have soundly beaten the boasting aristocratic Xerxes of the neighborhood. This is doubtless all there is of the matter, and it only needs some new Strauss to apply his dissecting criticism to the narratives to demonstrate this, and show the origin and progress of the myth.

Thomas Baldwin Thayer, Christianity Against Infidelity: Or, The Truth of the Gospel History, 2nd ed. (Cincinatti: John A. Gurley, 1849), pp. 392-93

Ours is a historical religion

tim — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 00:01:20 +0000

There has been a tendency of recent years to sneer at the evidential school of the last century, as if Lardner, Paley, and the rest had failed in the task they set themselves, and as if their failure did not much matter to us who have a more sure foundation for our faith. Such sneers indicate a complete failure to apprehend that ours is a historical religion, the cardinal tenet of which is that some eighteen centuries ago there was in this world One who was like no one else who ever lived in the world, and who then did a work for the benefit of the world which none but He could have accomplished. All those celebrations of the Christian year of which I spoke are nothing but an expanded expression of our faith in the articles of the baptismal creed. Without such faith I do not see how anyone can rightly call himself a Christian.

George Salmon, Non-miraculous Christianity: And Other Sermons Preached in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin (London: Macmillan and Co., 1881), pp. 3-4

The conversion of St. Paul

tim — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 00:59:57 +0000

And here let me pause to say that it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of St. Paul’s conversion as one of the evidences of Christianity. That he should have passed, by one flash of conviction, not only from darkness to light, but from one direction of life to the very opposite, is not only characteristic of the man, but evidential of the power and significance of Christianity. That the same man who, just before, was persecuting Christianity with the most violent hatred, should come all at once to believe in Him whose followers he had been seeking to destroy, and that in this faith he should become a “new creature”—what is this but a victory which Christianity owed to nothing but the spell of its own inherent power? Of all who have been converted to the faith of Christ, there is not one in whose case the Christian principle broke so immediately through everything opposed to it, and asserted so absolutely its triumphant superiority. Henceforth to Paul Christianity was summed up in the one word Christ. And to what does he testify respecting Jesus? To almost every single primarily important fact respecting His Incarnation, Life, Sufferings, Betrayal, Last Supper, Trial, Crucifixion, Resurrection, Ascension, and Heavenly Exaltation. We complain that nearly two thousand years have passed away, and that the brightness of historical events is apt to fade, and even their very outline to be obliterated, as they sink into the “dark backward and abysm of time.” Well, but are we more keen-sighted, more hostile, more eager to disprove the evidence, than the consummate legalist, the admired rabbi, the commissioner of the Sanhedrin, the leading intellect in the schools—learned as Hillel, patriotic as Judas of Gaulon, burning with zeal for the Law as intense as that of Shammai? He was not separated from the events, as we are, by centuries of time. He was not liable to be blinded, as we are, by the dazzling glamour of a victorious Christendom. He had mingled daily with men who had watched from Bethlehem to Golgotha the life of the Crucified,—not only with His simple-hearted followers, but with His learned and powerful enemies. He had talked with the priests who had consigned Him to the cross; he had put to death the followers who had wept beside His tomb. He had to face the unutterable horror which, to any orthodox Jew, was involved in the thought of a Messiah who “had hung upon a tree.” He had heard again and again the proofs which satisfied an Annas and a Gamaliel that Jesus was a deceiver of the people. The events on which the Apostles relied, in proof of His divinity, had taken place in the full blaze of contemporary knowledge. He had not to deal with uncertainties of criticism or assaults on authenticity. He could question, not ancient documents, but living men; he could analyse, not fragmentary records, but existing evidence. He had thousands of means close at hand whereby to test the reality or unreality of the Resurrection in which, unto this time, he had so passionately and contemptuously disbelieved. In accepting this half-crushed and wholly execrated faith he had everything in the world to lose—he had nothing conceivable to gain; and yet, in spite of all—overwhelmed by a conviction which he felt to be irresistible—Saul, the Pharisee, became a witness of the Resurrection, a preacher of the Cross.

Frederic William Farrar, The Life and Work of St. Paul, vol. 1 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1879), pp. 114-15.

The very groundwork of our faith

tim — Mon, 02 Jan 2012 00:01:24 +0000

And is this conviction then reasonable? Is it more than the adoption of truth on the authority of another? It is. The principle on which all these assertions are received, is not that they have been made by this or that credible individual or body of persons, who have gone through the proof—this may have its weight with the critical and learned—but the main principle adopted by all, intelligible by all, and reasonable in itself, is, that these assertions are set forth, bearing on their face a challenge of refutation. The assertions are like witnesses placed in a box to be confronted. Scepticism, infidelity, and scoffing, form the very groundwork of our faith. As long as these are known to exist and to assail it, so long are we sure that any untenable assertion may and will be refuted. The benefit accruing to Christianity in this respect from the occasional success of those who have found flaws in the several parts of evidence, is invaluable. We believe what is not disproved most reasonably, because we know that there are those abroad who are doing their utmost to disprove it. We believe the witness, not because we know him and esteem him, but because he is confronted, cross-examined, suspected, and assailed by arts fair and unfair. It is not his authority, but the reasonableness of the case. It becomes conviction well-grounded, and not assent to man’s words.

Samuel Hinds, An Inquiry into the Proofs, Nature, and Extent of Inspiration (Oxford: J. Parker,1831), pp. 38-39.

How different is the case

tim — Mon, 26 Dec 2011 00:01:35 +0000

It is true that there are certain very abstract arguments, after the spirit if not the letter of Saint Anselm, notable for their brevity and apparent force, which neither are obviously unsound nor in any obvious way beg the question. . . . But it is hard to imagine Anselm convincing, say, the Norsemen with this sort of thing. As Hume has Philo say, “men ever did, and ever will, derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.” How different is the case with miracles. The most notable religious miracles have to do with seas and storms, with wine and blood and the grave, and these subjects move the heart as well as the intellect. Thus it has always seemed to me that the most persuasive argument for theism is the historical argument—the argument from miracles. This sort of robust empirical argument has been neglected of late in philosophy owing to a tale about a “decisive argument” and “an everlasting check” and a “devastating objection.” But let us turn away from mythology, and treat more gently the devotions of the pious, having ourselves – we philosophers – nothing of interest to say when in reading we chance upon a miracle, upon a sea parted or a life renewed, the shining angels and the women weeping.

David Johnson, Hume, Holism, and Miracles (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999). pp. 98-100.

A due agnosticism

tim — Mon, 19 Dec 2011 00:01:40 +0000

The sort of statement that arouses our deepest scepticism is the statement that something in a Gospel cannot be historical because it shows a theology or an ecclesiology too developed for so early a date. For this implies that we know, first of all, that there was any development in the matter, and secondly, how quickly it proceeded. It even implies an extraordinary homogeneity and continuity of development: implicitly denies that anyone could have greatly anticipated anyone else. This seems to involve knowing about a number of long dead people—for the early Christians were, after all, people—things of which I believe few of us could have given an accurate account if we had lived among them; all the forward and backward surge of discussion, preaching, and individual religious experience. I could not speak with similar confidence about the circle I have chiefly lived in myself. I could not describe the history even of my own thought as confidently as these men describe the history of the early Church’s mind. And I am perfectly certain no one else could. Suppose a future scholar knew I had abandoned Christianity in my teens, and that, also in my teens, I went to an atheist tutor. Would not this seem far better evidence than most of what we have about the development of Christian theology in the first two centuries? Would not he conclude that my apostasy was due to the tutor? And then reject as ‘backward projection’ any story which represented me as an atheist before I went to the tutor? Yet he would be wrong. I am sorry to have become once more autobiographical. But reflection on the extreme improbability of his own life—by historical standards—seems to me a profitable exercise for everyone. It encourages a due agnosticism.

For agnosticism is, in a sense, what I am preaching. I do not wish to reduce the sceptical element in your minds. I am only suggesting that it need not be reserved exclusively for the New Testament and the Creeds. Try doubting something else.

C. S. Lewis, “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” in Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), pp. 163-64.

One layman’s reaction

tim — Mon, 12 Dec 2011 00:01:22 +0000

My picture of one layman’s reaction—and I think it is not a rare one—would be incomplete without some account of the hopes he secretly cherishes and the naïve reflections with which he sometimes keeps his spirits up.

You must face the fact that he does not expect the present school of theological thought to be everlasting. He thinks, perhaps wishfully thinks, that the whole thing may blow over. I have learned in other fields of study how transitory the ‘assured results of modern scholarship’ may be, how soon the scholarship ceases to be modern. The confident treatment to which the New Testament is subjected is no longer applied to profane texts. There used to be English scholars who were prepared to cut up Henry VI between half a dozen authors and assign his share to each. We don’t do that now. When I was a boy one would have been laughed at for supposing there had been a real Homer: the disintegrators seemed to have triumphed for ever. But Homer seems to be creeping back. Even the belief of the ancient Greeks that the Mycenaeans were their ancestors and spoke Greek has been surprisingly supported. We may without disgrace believe in a historical Arthur. Everywhere, except in theology, there has been a vigorous growth of scepticism about scepticism itself. We can’t keep ourselves from muttering multa renascentur quae jam cecidere. [“Many now in disuse will be revived”—Horace]

Nor can a man of my age ever forget how suddenly and completely the idealist philosophy of his youth fell. McTaggart, Green, Bosanquet, Bradley seemed enthroned for ever; they went down as suddenly as the Bastille. And the interesting thing is that while I lived under that dynasty I felt various difficulties and objections which I never dared to express. They were so frightfully obvious that I felt sure they must be mere misunderstandings: the great men could not have made such very elementary mistakes as those which my objections implied. But very similar objections—though put, not doubt, far more cogently than I could have put them—were among the criticisms which finally prevailed. They would now be the stock answers to English Hegeliansim. If anyone present tonight has felt the same shy and tentative doubts about the great Biblical critics, perhaps he need not feel quite certain that they are only his stupidity. They may have a future he little dreams of.

C. S. Lewis, “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” in Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), pp. 162-63

Against Hume

tim — Mon, 05 Dec 2011 00:01:15 +0000

THUS much I thought it proper to premise, not to serve as an apology for the design of this tract, (the design surely needs no apology, whatever the world may judge of the execution) but to expose the shallowness of that pretext, under which the advocates for infidelity in this age commonly take shelter. Whilst therefore we enforce an argument, which, in support of our religion, was so frequently insisted on by its divine founder, we will not dread the reproachful titles of dangerous friends, or disguised enemies of revelation. Such are the titles, which the writer, whose sentiments we propose in these papers to canvass, hath bestow’d on his antagonists; not, I believe, through malice against them, but as a sort of excuse for himself, or at least a handle for introducing a very strange and unmeaning compliment to the religion of his country, after a very bold attempt to undermine it. We will however do him the justice to own, that he hath put it out of our power to retort the charge. No intelligent person, who hath carefully perused the Essay on Miracles, will impute to the author either of those ignominious characters.

My primary intention in undertaking an answer to the aforesaid essay, hath invariably been, to contribute all in my power, to the defense of a religion, which I esteem the greatest blessing conferred by Heaven on the sons of men. It is at the same time a secondary motive of considerable weight, to vindicate philosophy, at least that most important branch of it which ascertains the rules of reasoning, from those absurd consequences, as I imagine, which this author’s theory naturally leads us to. The theme is arduous. The adversary is both subtle and powerful. With such an adversary, I should on very unequal terms enter the lists, had I not the advantage of being on the side of truth. And an eminent advantage this doubtless is. It requires but moderate abilities to speak in defence of a good cause. A good cause demands but a distinct exposition and a fair hearing; and we may say with great propriety, it will speak for itself. But to adorn error with the semblance of truth, and make the worse appear the better reason, requires all the arts of ingenuity and invention; arts in which few or none have been more expert than Mr Hume. It is much to be regretted, that on some occasions he hath so ill applied them.

George Campbell, A Dissertation on Miracles (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid & J. Bell, 1762), pp. 4-6.

Christianity and argument

tim — Mon, 28 Nov 2011 00:01:46 +0000

“CHRISTIANITY,” it hath been said, “is not founded in argument.” If it were only meant by these words, that the religion of Jesus could not, by the single aid of reasoning, produce its full effect upon the heart; every true Christian would chearfully subscribe to them. No arguments unaccompanied by the influence of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God; though even to such conversion, arguments are, by the agency of the Spirit, render’d subservient. Again, if we were to understand by this aphorism, that the principles of our religion could never have been discover’d, by the natural and unassisted faculties of man; this position, I presume, would be as little disputed as the former. But if, on the contrary, under the cover of an ambiguous expression, it is intended to insinuate, that those principles, from their very nature, can admit no rational evidence of their truth, (and this, by the way, is the only meaning which can avail our antagonists) the gospel, as well as common sense, loudly reclaims against it.

The Lord JESUS CHRIST, the author of our religion, often argu’d, both with his disciples and with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason. Without this faculty, he well knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law. He argu’d from prophecy, and the conformity of the event to the prediction^{^[1]}. He argu’d from the testimony of John the Baptist, who was generally acknowledged to be a prophet^{^[2]}. He argu’d from the miracles which he himself perform’d^{^[3]}, as uncontrovertible evidences, that GOD Almighty operated by him, and had sent him. He expostulates with his enemies, that they did not use their reason on this subject. Why, says he, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right^{^[4]}? In like manner we are called upon by the apostles of our Lord, to act the part of wise men, and judge impartially of what they say^{^[5]}. Those who do so, are highly commended, for the candour and prudence they discover, in an affair of so great consequence^{^[6]}. We are even commanded, to be always ready to give an answer to every man, that asketh us a reason of our hope^{^[7]}; in meekness to instruct them that oppose themselves^{^[8]}; and earnestly to contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints^{^[9]}. God has neither in natural nor reveal’d religion, left himself without a witness; but has in both given moral and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to render the atheist and the unbeliever without excuse. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine. We must prove all things, as we are expressly enjoin’d in holy writ, if we would ever hope to hold fast that which is good^{^[10]}.

George Campbell, A Dissertation on Miracles (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid & J. Bell, 1762), pp. 1-4.

^{^[1]}Luke xxiv. 25. &c. John v. 39. & 46.

^{^[2]}John v. 32. & 33.

^{^[3]}John v. 36. x. 25. 37. 38. xiv. 10. 11.

^{^[4]}Luke xii. 57.

^{^[5]}I Cor. x. 15.

^{^[6]}Acts xvii. 11.

^{^[7]}I Peter iii. 15.

^{^[8]}2 Tim. ii. 25.

^{^[9]}Jude 3.

^{^[10]}I Thess. v. 21.

They have appealed to the bar of reason

tim — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 00:01:50 +0000

Various are the ways they have taken to destroy its credit and authority, as sufficiently appeareth in the account which hath been given in the foregoing letters. And considering how many writers have appeared in this cause within this century past, and what liberty they have had to propose their reasons and their objections, it can hardly be supposed that they have left any thing unattempted that had the face of argument, by which they thought they could answer their end. And therefore if it appears, as I hope it does, upon the view which hath been taken of them, that their most plausible objections have been solidly answered; it is to be hoped, that their attempts, however ill intended, will turn to the advantage of the Christian cause; as it will then appear, how little it’s enemies have been able to say against it, considered in its original purity, even where they have had the utmost freedom of proposing their sentiments. They have appealed to the bar of reason; the advocates for Christianity have followed them to that bar, and have fairly shewn, that the evidences of revealed religion are such as approve themselves to impartial reason, and, if taken together, are fully sufficient to satisfy an honest and unprejudiced mind.

John Leland, A View of the Principal Deistical Writers, vol. 1 (London: B. Dod, 1754), pp. 391-92