The celebrated argument of Hume against Miracles—that they are contrary to Experience, while the untruth of Testimony is not—contains several fallacies. There is over-statement on one side, and understatement on the other. Miracles are referred to without any regard to their character and purpose; and Testimony, without any consideration of its nature and circumstances. This cannot be right. The improbability of the Christian miracles is not greater than arises from the assumed absence, not in all ages of the globe, but in the previous ages of human history, of such signs of a Divine mission; and this is very much less than the improbability of a useless deviation from the course of Nature. The improbability of the Christian Testimony being untrue is, not that of any testimony being untrue, but of such testimony being untrue, from such persons, in such circumstances; and that not in one case, but in many, men living and dying for the truth. The assumed impossibility of Miracles has no support from Experience. They are not to be regarded as violations or suspensions of the laws of Nature, nor as effects without adequate causes; but as superhuman works attesting and promoting a Divine mission. Their reality must depend on the only evidence by which past events can be known—the testimony of contemporaries, and the continuance of effects in no other way to be accounted for.
John Hensley Godwin, Intellectual Principles: Or, Elements of Moral Science (London: James Clarke and Co., 1884), pp. 254-55, footnote.